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Abstract
& Cognitive control processes enable us to adjust our
behavior to changing environmental demands. Although
neuropsychological studies suggest that the critical cortical
region for cognitive control is the prefrontal cortex, neuro-
imaging studies have emphasized the interplay of prefrontal
and parietal cortices. This raises the fundamental question
about the different contributions of prefrontal and parietal
areas in cognitive control. It was assumed that the prefrontal
cortex biases processing in posterior brain regions. This as-
sumption leads to the hypothesis that neural activity in the
prefrontal cortex should precede parietal activity in cognitive
control. The present study tested this assumption by com-
bining results from functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) providing high spatial resolution and event-related
potentials (ERPs) to gain high temporal resolution. We
collected ERP data using a modified task-switching paradigm.
In this paradigm, a situation where the same task was in-
dicated by two different cues was compared with a situation
where two cues indicated different tasks. Only the latter
condition required updating of the task set. Task-set updating
was associated with a midline negative ERP deflection peaking
around 470 msec. We placed dipoles in regions activated in a
previous fMRI study that used the same paradigm (left inferior
frontal junction, right inferior frontal gyrus, right parietal
cortex) and fitted their directions and magnitudes to the ERP
effect. The frontal dipoles contributed to the ERP effect earlier
than the parietal dipole, providing support for the view that
the prefrontal cortex is involved in updating of general task
representations and biases relevant stimulus–response associ-
ations in the parietal cortex. &
INTRODUCTION
Everyday life requires flexible and ongoing adjustment
to different task situations. We can easily switch from
one cognitive or motor task to the next with seemingly
minimal effort. However, from cognitive psychology, we
know that this flexibility requires higher-order cognitive
control processes (Meiran, 1996; Monsell, 1996). One
fundamental question in cognitive neuroscience relates
to the neural mechanisms involved in these processes.
From the neuropsychological perspective, the answer
to this question seems to be relatively clear: Patients
with prefrontal lesions have problems in situations
which require the flexible adjustment to different task
demands (Owen et al., 1993; Milner, 1963), suggesting
that cognitive flexibility is critically reliant on the pre-
frontal cortex. The neuroimaging literature provides a
less straightforward answer. In recent years, a number
of imaging studies have investigated cognitive control
processes using a wide range of paradigms (Brass & von
Cramon, 2002; Rubia et al., 2001; Banich et al., 2000;
Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon,
2000; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). In
contrast to the neuropsychological literature, neuro-
imaging studies show that frontal and parietal brain
regions are both involved in cognitive control, raising
questions about the specific and unique contributions
of prefrontal and parietal brain regions. Theories on the
basis of single-unit recordings and lesion experiments
in monkeys have assumed that the contribution of the
prefrontal cortex is to bias processing in posterior brain
regions (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Tomita, Ohbayashi,
Nakahara, Hasegawa, & Mijashita, 1999). If this assump-
tion holds true, one would expect prefrontal cortex
activation to precede parietal activation during the
implementation of cognitive control.
The aim of the present experiment was to test this
assumption by combining results from a functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment which
provides a high spatial resolution and event-related
potentials (ERPs) to gain high temporal resolution.
We used a task-switching paradigm (Monsell, 2003) to
investigate the flexible adjustment to different task
situations. The task-switching paradigm compared
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with other cognitive control paradigms allows one to
separate task-related control processes from response-
related control processes by presenting a cue in ad-
vance of the task to be performed (Meiran, 1996). We
have recently developed an experimental paradigm to
investigate task preparation with fMRI (Brass & von
Cramon, 2004). In this paradigm, participants alternated
between two tasks, namely, judging whether a number
was odd or even (parity task) or judging whether the
number was greater or less than 30 (magnitude task).
Four arbitrary task cues were used, two of which
signaled the magnitude task and two of which signaled
the parity task. This cue-to-task mapping allows us to
disentangle a switch of the cue from a task switch
(Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Mayr & Kliegel, 2003). In
most of the trials, two sequential task cues preceded
the target and were both followed by a preparation
interval (Figure 1). In addition, catch trials were pre-
sented in which the target appeared after the first cue.
These catch trials ensured that participants paid atten-
tion to the first cue. By comparing a switch of cues and
cue meaning (two different cues that indicate different
tasks, meaning switch [MS]) to a switch of cues without
a switch of cue meaning (two different cues that
indicate the same tasks, meaning repetition [MR]), we
could investigate the updating of the task representa-
tion without confounding cue encoding. Although the
cue changes in both conditions, the task set changes
only in the MS condition. In addition to trial type, we
manipulated the cue–target interval (CTI). In the short
CTI, participants were required to respond 60 msec
after the relevant cue (the second cue in the three
double-cue conditions and the first cue in the single-
cue condition), whereas in the long CTI condition, they
had 700 msec to prepare. The CTI manipulation was
introduced as an additional manipulation check to
ensure that the first cue was indeed processed. If the
double-cue conditions differ regarding the processes
invoked, we would expect a reaction time (RT) differ-
ence in the short CTI condition, but not in the long CTI
condition, because participants are not able to prepare
the second cue in the short CTI before the target is
presented. Hence, the experimental design consisted of
the factors Trial type (MR, MS) and CTI (short, long).
The single-cue condition was analyzed separately be-
cause of the different trial structure.
In a recent fMRI study, we showed that regions in the
posterior fronto-lateral cortex and in the intraparietal
sulcus (IPS) are related to the updating of the task
(Brass & von Cramon, 2004). By using the cortical foci
from this fMRI experiment to model the spatial sources
of ERP data collected with the identical paradigm, we
investigated whether prefrontal cortex activation pre-
cedes the parietal cortex activation. If so, these data
would strongly support the assumption of a hierarchical
organization of prefrontal and parietal cortices in cogni-
tive control.
RESULTS
Behavioral Findings
Figure 2 depicts the main behavioral findings. In the
single-cue condition, RTs were faster when the CTI was
long than when it was short. This effect of CTI was
significant (T18 = 4.79, p < .001), suggesting that the
first cue was used to prepare the relevant task. A similar
finding was present for error rates, however, it did not
reach significance (T18 = 1.64, p = .12).
We will now focus on the double-cue conditions in
which the second cue was different from the first one.
By comparing the MS and MR conditions, effects of
differential task preparation processes can be extracted.
RT and error rate data were subjected to repeated-
measures ANOVAs with the factors Cue meaning (two
levels: switch vs. repetition) and CTI (two levels: long vs.
short), revealing main effects of Cue meaning [RT:
F(1,18) = 19.82, p < .001; error rates: F(1,18) = 6.02,
p < .05] and CTI [RT: F(1,18) = 151.64, p < .001; error
rates: F(1,18) = 21.73, p < .001] and an interaction of
these two factors [RT: F(1,18) = 20.35, p < .001; error
rates: F(1,18) = 7.41, p < .05]. Subordinate ANOVAs
performed separately for short and long CTIs confirmed
that the effect of cue meaning was only present for the
short CTI [RT: F(1,18) = 32.48, p < .001; error rates:
Figure 1. Trial structure and exact experimental timing. In the
three double-cue conditions, two task cues were presented before
the target was displayed. The cues were separated by a fixed CCI. In
the single-cue condition, the target was presented after the first cue.
The bottom part of the figure displays the cue–task mapping. Two
different cues were assigned to each task.
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F(1,18) = 11.06, p < .005] and not for the long CTI
( ps > .8), suggesting that in these trials the interval
between the second cue and the target onset was
sufficiently long to implement the new task set in the
MS condition. The effect of CTI was present in both the
MR and MS conditions ( ps< .001).
When comparing the overall RT of the single-cue
condition and the double-cue condition for the short
CTI, an RT difference of about 200 msec was found. We
assume that this difference is due to the fact that
participants did not always use the first cue to prepare
the task. This is in accordance with the finding of
DeJong, Berendsen, and Cools (1999) who could show
that participants sometimes postpone task preparation
until the target appears.
ERP Findings
The grand-average ERP waveforms for the conditions MR
and MS, as well as the difference waveform (MS  MR)
locked to the second cue, are depicted in Figure 3. As
can be seen, the ERPs begin to differ around 400 msec
after the cue. In particular, in the MS condition, a
negative-going def lection is visible peaking around
470 msec. It seems superimposed on a more sustained
positivity present in both conditions and is much more
prominent than in the MR condition. In both conditions,
a negative-going slow wave (presumably a contingent
negative variation [CNV]) can be seen in the last
200 msec before target onset.
These observations were confirmed by statistical ana-
lyses. The ERP in the MS condition was significantly
more negative than in the MR condition in the time
range from 400 to 520 msec in the right anterior, right
central, and midline central regions of interest, and from
440 to 520 msec additionally in the midline anterior, left
central, an left posterior regions. In the time range
between 600 and 800 msec, the ERP for MS was more
positive than for MR (in posterior regions starting at 600;
in central regions starting at 640 msec, and in anterior
regions starting at 680 msec), reflecting that the CNV
had an earlier onset in the MR condition.1
Dipole Modeling
The dipole model accounted for 74% of the measure-
ment variance. This leaves a rather large portion of the
signal unexplained. However, the signal-to-noise ratio
over all channels and time steps in the time window of
the significant negative ERP effect of the grand average
with respect to the baseline interval was just 4.4. This
means that under the assumption that the noise in the
analysis time interval is the same as in the baseline
interval, only 81% of the variance of the observed signal
stems from brain activity. This accounts for most of the
unexplained variance (19% out of 26%). In other words,
the spatio-temporal dipole fit of the directions and
magnitudes of the dipoles yields a model explaining
91% of the available variance, which is not attributed to
noise.2 The directions of the computed dipoles are
shown in Figure 4A. For the left fronto-lateral cortex
and the right IPS, tangential dipoles have been found,
indicating sulcal activity. For the right inferior frontal
gyrus, a radial source was reconstructed, representing
gyral activity. The time courses of the model are
depicted in Figure 4B, suggesting that the frontal areas
are particularly active during the early part of the
investigated time window, whereas the IPS comes into
play later. A repeated-measures ANOVA computed from
those time steps, where the correlation between data
and model was better than .9 (see Figure 4B), revealed
a significant main effect for the factor Dipole [F(2,21) =
3.27, p = .04] and a significant interaction between the
factors Dipole and Window [F(2,42) =3.51, p = .03].
Follow-up pairwise t tests revealed a significant differ-
ence between the two time windows for all three
dipoles (see Figure 5). Thus, the statistics confirms
the above-stated result that the frontal sources are
more active in the early part of the N400 time window
Figure 2. Behavioral findings. Response times (top) and error rates
(bottom) in the different cueing conditions for short and long CTIs.
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and the parietal source is stronger in the late part.
Regarding the temporal characteristics of the left and
right frontal cortex, the dipole analysis does not allow
more specific conclusions.
DISCUSSION
By combining results from an fMRI experiment with
ERP data, we show that prefrontal activity precedes
parietal activity in cognitive control processes. These
results provide strong evidence for the assumption that
the parietal and prefrontal cortices serve different
functions in cognitive control as was previously sug-
gested in the context of research with nonhuman
primates (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Tomita et al., 1999).
We assume that the prefrontal cortex provides an
abstract task representation which is then further spec-
ified in the IPS.
ERP Correlates of Task Updating
Contrasting the condition in which participants were
required to update the task representation with the
condition in which only the cue but not the cue
meaning changed revealed a negativity with a fronto-
central maximum that peaked about 470 msec after the
presentation of the task cue. To our knowledge, this is
the first ERP evidence for task updating when cue
encoding was controlled. Considering that this negativ-
ity is associated with processing of a task representation
that is incongruent with the task prepared after the first
cue, it seems to share features with the N400, a compo-
Figure 4. (A) Dipoles for
the negative ERP effect
(400–500 msec). The positions
were taken from Brass and von
Cramon (2004), whereas the
directions were obtained from
the grand average of the
task-switch effect in the ERP
data by nonlinear fitting. Upper
row: left inferior frontal
junction (IFJ ). Middle row:
right inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG). Lower row: right
intraparietal sulcus (IPS). (B)
Top: Time courses of the
dipoles fitted to the grand
average of the N400. Bottom:
Time course of correlation
of dipole model with
grand-average data.
Figure 3. (A) Grand mean
ERP waveforms for MS and
MR for the epoch after onset
of the second cue (t = 0) in
the long CTI condition. (B)
Difference wave resulting from
subtracting cue switch from
MS. Shaded bars indicate a
significant difference of the
difference wave from zero.
(C) Topographical scalp
distribution of the negative
ERP difference in the time
range 400–520 msec.
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nent first described in the language domain (Kutas &
Hillyard, 1980). N400-like deflections have been de-
scribed for a number of occasions, in which the meaning
of the stimulus violates the semantic context, and the
occurrence of these deflections seems to be indepen-
dent of the modality of either the context or the
violating stimulus (Federmeier, Kluender, & Kutas,
2003; Hamm, Johnson, & Kirk, 2002). The amplitude
of the N400 is assumed to reflect the amount of pro-
cessing needed to integrate the stimulus into the given
context. In the present experiment, the N400-like neg-
ativity is most pronounced when the task meaning
indicated by the second cue is different from the task
prepared on the first cue. In analogy to the N400 in
other domains it could be assumed to reflect updating
processes needed to integrate the required task repre-
sentation into the context (i.e., task preparation). Inter-
estingly, the scalp topography of the negativity seems to
have a more frontal maximum than in the language-
related N400 (which usually has a centro-parietal dis-
tribution). This is also reflected in the difference of
our fMRI-based dipole model as compared to source-
localization findings in the language domain that sug-
gested peri-sylvian sources (D’Arcy, Connolly, Service,
Hawco, & Houlihan, 2004; Helenius, Salmelin, Service, &
Connolly, 1998; Simos, Basile, & Papanicolaou, 1997).
There are several neurophysiological studies which
have investigated ERP components in task switching
(Karayanidis, Coltheart, Michie, & Murphy, 2003; Wylie,
Javitt, & Foxe, 2003; Rushworth, Passingham, & Nobre,
2002) and variants of the Wisconsin Card Sorting
(WCST) (Barcelo, 2003; Barcelo, Perianez, & Knight,
2002). Interestingly, these studies have reported a pos-
itivity in the preparation interval (Karayanidis et al.,
2003; Barcelo et al., 2002; Rushworth et al., 2002). It
should be noted that we also found a more sustained
P300-like positivity (from about 300 to 600 msec) for
both conditions on which the differentially modulated
negative deflection was superimposed. However, previ-
ous studies are not directly comparable to the present
study because they differed with respect to crucial
experimental variables. In WCST studies and the study
of Rushworth et al. (2002), the switch operation was
embedded in a sequence of repetition trials (Barcelo,
2003; Barcelo et al., 2002; Rushworth et al., 2002). In
these studies, the ERP modulation might have signaled
the relative novelty of the switch operation compared
with the repetition of the trial. This is exactly the
interpretation favored by Barcelo et al. (2002), arguing
that the P300, which was usually found in the context of
bottom-up processing of novel nontargets, reflects some
kind of top-down modulation in the context of set
switching.
In the study of Karayanidis et al. (2003) and Wylie et al.
(2003), switch and repetition trials were presented in
close alternation. However, their study differed in an-
other crucial aspect from the present experiment. They
used a so-called alternating runs paradigm (Rogers &
Monsell, 1995). In this paradigm, the tasks are presented
in a predictable order. This allows the participant to
predict the identity of the upcoming task on the basis of
the task sequence. In this paradigm, it is very difficult to
determine when the preparation of the next trial starts.
Interestingly, in the study of Karayanidis et al. (2003), a
tendency for an N400-like component similar to the
negativity reported here could be observed in the data
(see Figure 7, p. 342, response–stimulus interval
1200 msec). However, this difference wave was not
significant. This might be related to the fact that in
alternating-runs paradigms the updating of the task
representation is not temporally locked to a specific
event and therefore a temporal jittering can be assumed.
Interestingly, studies on Stroop interference tasks
using EEG have found a negative modulation when
comparing incongruent and congruent trials (Markela-
Lerenc et al., 2004; Liotti, Woldorff, Perez, & Mayberg,
2000; West & Alain, 1999). The study by Markela-Lerenc
et al. (2004), for example, reported an N400-like com-
ponent for which they fitted a dipole into the left lateral
prefrontal cortex. It is very reasonable to assume that
the updating of the relevant task representations is a
crucial process involved in Stroop interference (Monsell,
Taylor, & Murphy, 2001). In the task-switching para-
digm, this updating process is required because partic-
ipants alternate between different task representations
and therefore are not able to adjust to only one task set.
In the Stroop task, this process is required because an
irrelevant, but dominant, task set (reading the color of
the word) permanently interferes with the relevant task
set. Accordingly, fMRI activations found in the Stroop
task and in the task-switching paradigm overlap to a
high degree (Derrfuss, Brass, Neumann, & von Cramon,
2005; Derrfuss, Brass, & von Cramon, 2004). However, in
the Stroop task, task-related and response-related pro-
cesses are confounded. Accordingly, most ERP studies
which tried source localization in the Stroop task found
Figure 5. Dipole strength, averaged over subjects and time steps
with a correlation between model and grand-average data greater
than .9 in the early and late half of the N400 time window. The p values
refer to pairwise two-tailed t tests.
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a source in the fronto-median cortex. We assume that
this fronto-median source, which peaked after the fronto-
lateral source (Markela-Lerenc et al., 2004), reflects
response-related processes, namely, monitoring for re-
sponse conf lict (Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004;
Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2001). In the present task,
response conflict is not a confounding factor, as we
investigated the time period before target presentation
in which no response tendencies could be built up, yet.
In the last 200 msec before target onset, a positive
difference between the MS and MR conditions was
found. This difference was due to the delayed onset of
the CNV preceding the target stimulus in the MS condi-
tion. This finding provides a hint that in this condition
more time was needed for an additional process pre-
ceding the CNV, namely, integrating the new contextual
information to activate the relevant task set. Interest-
ingly, Goffaux, Sinai, Pushkar, and Phillips (submitted)
observed a switch-related modulation of negative slow-
wave activity in cue-locked ERPs in a task-switching
paradigm as well.
A Hierarchical Model of Posterior Prefrontal and
Intraparietal Cortex Function in Cognitive Control
In recent years, a number of neuroimaging studies have
investigated the neural mechanisms involved in cogni-
tive control processes (e.g., Banich et al., 2000; Dove,
Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000;
MacDonald et al., 2000). Most of these studies provided
evidence that not only the prefrontal cortex but also
areas in the intraparietal cortex play a crucial role for
the control of our behavior. The classical view was that
the parietal cortex is involved in response-related pro-
cesses. In a recent fMRI study, we showed that activa-
tion in the IPS was independent from response-related
processes (Brass & von Cramon, 2002). This raises the
question whether it is really possible to separate the
contribution of the IPS and posterior prefrontal cortex
in cognitive control. Recently, Tomita et al. (1999)
could further clarify the role of the prefrontal cortex
and posterior cortices in a memory task. Using a lesion
approach in nonhuman primates, they could demon-
strate that the prefrontal cortex biases processing in
memory-related posterior cortices. A similar hierarchical
organization could be assumed for the relation of the
posterior prefrontal cortex and the IPS in cognitive
control. One way to test such an assumption in human
subjects is to experimentally manipulate potential pro-
cesses related to the prefrontal and parietal cortex (e.g.,
Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen, & Gabrieli, 2002). In
the present study, we used the high temporal resolu-
tion of EEG in combination with results from an fMRI
study to temporally separate the contribution of the
prefrontal cortex and the parietal cortex in cognitive
control. Dipole modeling of the observed negative ERP
effect suggests that its first part mostly resulted from
activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex. Later the activity
shifted to the parietal cortex. These findings strongly
suggest that the lateral prefrontal cortex precedes the
intraparietal cortex in cognitive control. A similar result
was reported by Rushworth et al. (2002). The parietal
cortex came into play before the task was presented.
Even if the parietal areas are involved in preparation-
related processes (Ruge, Brass, Koch, Rubin, Meiran &
von Cramon, 2005; Brass & von Cramon, 2002, 2004),
the temporal order of prefrontal and parietal activation
strongly suggests that both cortices provide task infor-
mation on different levels of abstraction. In the lateral
prefrontal cortex, the task representation is on a very
abstract level. It specifies the task goal in general terms.
Such a representation might be coded in a language-
like format. In the IPS, this abstract task representation
is further specified. How close such a representation
maps the actual task description is an open question,
which has to be addressed in future research.
METHODS
Participants
Nineteen healthy volunteers (8 women) recruited at the
University of Leipzig participated in this study. Their age
ranged from 22 to 37 years (mean 25.6), they were all
right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Written informed consent according to the Dec-
laration of Helsinki was obtained prior to the study.
Experimental Design
In this study, we used a modified version of the
paradigm introduced by Sudevan and Taylor (1987).
Numbers between 20 and 40 (except 30) were pre-
sented on the computer screen. Participants had to
perform two tasks: judging whether a number was
smaller or greater than 30 (magnitude task) and judg-
ing whether the number was odd or even (parity task).
Which task they had to execute on any given trial was
signaled by a task cue presented as a frame surround-
ing the target number. In the double-cue conditions,
participants received two task cues before the actual
task was presented. These task cues could indicate the
same (e.g., magnitude, magnitude) or a different task
(magnitude, parity). Each experimental trial began with
a fixation cross which was presented for 200 msec. The
first task cue was then presented for 100 msec, fol-
lowed 700 msec later by the second cue (i.e., a fixed
cue–cue interval [CCI]). After the presentation of
the second cue for 100 msec, there was a CTI of 60
or 700 msec, after which the target was presented for
400 msec. Participants had 2000 msec to respond to
the target, after which the response window feedback
(correct, incorrect) was displayed for 200 msec. In
single-cue trials, the target was presented 60 or
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700 msec after the first and only cue. Two different
task cues were assigned to each task (triangle and
diamond to the parity task and square and inverted
triangle to the magnitude task). This resulted in
three double-cue conditions: a condition in which both
the cue and the cue meaning were repeated (cue-
repetition condition [CR]), a condition in which the
cue switched, but both cues indicated the same task
(cue switch, MR condition), and a condition in which
the cue switched to indicate the other task (cue switch,
MS condition).
The experiment consisted of three blocks, with 320
trials each. There were 576 double-cue trials (192 CR/192
MR /192 MS) randomly intermixed with 384 single-
cue trials. In 50% of each trial type, the CTI (time dif-
ference between onsets of last cue and target) was long
(800 msec), in the other half of trials it was short
(160 msec). Trial types were presented in randomized
order.
ERP Data Collection and Analysis
Participants were seated comfortably in a dimly lit,
acoustically shielded chamber. The electroencephalo-
gram (EEG) was recorded with Ag/AgCl electrodes from
62 electrode sites (the extended 10-20 system) refer-
enced to left mastoid and off-line re-referenced to the
average voltage of both mastoids. Electrode impedance
was kept below 5 k. The vertical electro-oculogram
(EOG) was recorded from electrodes placed above and
below the right eye. To monitor horizontal eye move-
ments, the EOG was collected from electrodes placed on
the outer canthus of the left and right eyes. EEG and
EOG were recorded continuously with a low-pass filter
of 70 Hz and AD converted with 22-bit resolution at a
sampling rate of 250 Hz.
As we were interested in task preparation, analysis
focused on the interval between second cue and target
onset in the double-cue condition with long CTIs.3
Therefore, signals in the epochs ranging from 200 msec
before to 800 msec after the onset of the second cue
were averaged. The average voltage in the 200 msec
preceding the cue onset served as a baseline. Prior to
averaging, the EEG epochs were scanned for muscular
and EOG artifacts. Whenever the standard deviation in a
200-msec interval exceeded 30 AV in the EOG channels,
the epoch was rejected.
For statistical analysis, electrode sites were pooled to
form nine topographical regions (Gevins et al., 1996;
Oken & Chiappa, 1986). The following regions of inter-
est were defined: left anterior (AF7, F5, F7, F3), midline
anterior (AFz, Fz, AF3, AF4), right anterior (AF8, F6, F8,
F4), left central (FC5, T7, C5, C3), midline central (FCz,
CPz, FC3, FC4), right central (FT8, T8, TP8, C6), left
posterior (P5, TP7, CP5, CP3), midline posterior (CPz,
Pz, P3, P4), and right posterior (CP4, CP6, TP8, P6). We
tested for the effects of cue meaning at these scalp
regions over successive 40-msec time bins by means of
t tests. ERP differences were only considered significant,
if they persisted for at least two consecutive time bins.
For the analysis of the spatio-temporal properties of
the observed ERP effect, we made use of the superior
spatial resolution of fMRI and the better temporal
resolution of the ERP. In the fMRI study using the same
paradigm as in the present work, Brass et al. (2004)
identified three regions when contrasting the MS and
MR conditions: left fronto-lateral cortex, right inferior
frontal gyrus, and right IPS (see Figure 4A). In order to
obtain information on the temporal evolvement of the
activity in these areas, we placed a dipole in each of
them and fitted their directions and magnitudes to the
grand average of the difference between conditions MS
and MR in the time range of the significant ERP effect
(400–520 msec). We employed the so-called fixed di-
poles model (Scherg & Berg, 1991), assuming the
directions of the dipoles to be constant over the entire
time interval of analysis, whereas the magnitudes (or
strengths) are allowed to assume different values for
every time step. This resulted in a direction vector and a
magnitude time course for each of the three dipoles.
The plausibility and significance of this result were then
tested in three different ways. First, we compared the
portion of the variance explained by the model to the
signal-to-noise ratio of the data, computed as the ratio of
variances in the analysis and the baseline time windows.
The dipole model should explain a fair amount of the
data variance after the noise variance has been sub-
tracted, with some unexplained variance allowed to
account for model mismatch errors. Second, the com-
puted dipole directions were assessed for plausibility.
Gyral activity, as in the inferior frontal gyrus, should be
represented by a radially oriented dipole, whereas sulcal
activity, as in the IPS, should be reflected by tangential
directions. Third, the data of the individual subjects
were projected linearly onto the dipole model and the
obtained magnitudes were investigated for statistical
significance by variance analysis. The analysis time win-
dow was divided into an early and a late subwindow (400
to 460 msec and 464 to 520 msec). Within each sub-
window, only those time steps were averaged, for which
the dipole model correlated with the grand-average data
with more than .90 (Figure 4B). These averages served
as a dependent variable in a repeated-measures ANOVA
over subjects with the factors Dipole (three levels) and
Window (two levels). If the brain activity distributed
significantly differently over the three activation sites in
the early N400 time window than in the late one, an
interaction between the two factors should be found.
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Notes
1. The time course of the CNV was investigated in detail at
electrode CPz. The onset of the CNV was determined by
comparing the amplitude at each sample point between 540
and 800 msec with the mean amplitude in the time window
520–550 msec (after the significant negative ERP effect) for
each condition by t tests. The first time point at which the
difference reaches significance was considered the onset of the
CNV. For MR, the onset was 572 msec after cue onset, for MS it
was 688 msec. To determine the slopes of the CNV, linear
regression analyses were calculated for the ERPs of each
participant for the time window between the onset and
800 msec. The mean slopes were 0.033 AV/msec (SEM 0.004)
for MR and 0.035 AV/msec (SEM 0.007) for MS and were not
different between both conditions (T18 = .3, p = .77). These
results suggest that both conditions are associated with a CNV
of similar slope, which is delayed in the MS condition by about
116 msec.
The statistical approach of binwise t tests yields the potential
problem of false-positive findings as a result of multiple tests.
Two reasons render this problem unlikely for the present
findings. First, the significant effects lasted for at least three
adjacent time bins. Second, at least three regions of interest
showed the effect at the same time.
2. If the position constraint of the dipoles is released, they
move only a short distance (<6 mm) and the explained
variance changes only from 74% to 75%. This suggests an (at
least locally) optimal solution.
3. A full report on the ERP measures as a function of cue and
CTI condition is forthcoming.
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